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FARM-LEVEL EVIDENCE ON THE RISK BALANCING HYPOTHESIS FROM 
ILLINOIS GRAIN FARMS 
 
The risk-balancing hypothesis contends that a farmer may opt to make offsetting 
adjustments in the farm’s capital structure in response to modifications of business risk 
conditions (Gabriel and Baker; Barry; Barry and Robison).  The hypothesis has strong 
analytic value and has been shown to be a useful analytical tool especially in policy 
issues.  For instance, Featherstone, et al. have constructed a theoretical model based on 
the risk-balancing hypothesis to demonstrate the failure of the government’s risk-
reducing and income-augmenting policies in increasing the farmers’ overall welfare 
conditions.  Their framework illustrates how reductions in business risk could induce 
farmers to make optimal leverage adjustments that ultimately affect the farm’s 
cumulative probability of earning very low rates of return on equity.  Robison and Barry 
and Barry and Robison also illustrate the balancing concept in the context of firm-level 
equilibrium analysis under risk. 
The concept’s strong theoretical merits are, however, eclipsed by its lack of strong 
empirical support using farm-level data to reinforce Gabriel and Baker’s preliminary 
findings based on aggregated U.S. farming data.  This study will provide the necessary 
econometric test of the hypothesis using a longitudinal farm data set from Illinois grain 
farms.  Moreover, this study will identify demographic and financial characteristics that 
can be attributed to farmers who subscribe to the risk-balancing strategy.  Proxy measures 
of certain risk management strategies will also be included in the analysis to determine 
their compatibility with the risk-balancing strategy.   3
Conceptual Framework 
The risk-balancing hypothesis establishes a link between business, financial and 
total risks.  Exogenous shocks that affect a firm’s level of business risk are believed to 
induce the firm to make offsetting adjustments in its financial leverage position.
1 The 
hypothesis suggests a risk management strategy that requires abstinence from incurring 
additional financial obligations whenever business risks are too high.  Conversely, 
upward adjustments in optimal leverage levels may be warranted whenever the level of 
business risk decreases.  The underlying motivation for this balancing behavior is the 
restoration of equilibrium or optimal conditions that have been disrupted by external 
shocks affecting the firm’s business risk condition. 
  The hypothesis can be derived using an equilibrium analysis approach that 
examines how imbalance due to external shocks that disrupt an existing optimal 
organization of assets and liabilities can be restored to equilibrium conditions through 
risk balancing.
2 The approach of Gabriel and Baker, based on the additive relationship 
between business and financial risk, illustrates absolute changes in total risk due to debt 
financing.  Barry’s approach, on the other hand, derives a multiplicative relationship 
between business and financial risk and explains the effect of incremental debt financing 
in terms of percentage increases in total risk.  These approaches are equivalent and differ 
only in measurement concepts.   
   4
The Additive Relationship 
This additive approach utilizes information from the firm’s income and cash flow 
statements. Business risk (BR) is defined in terms of the relative variability of either net 
operating income or net cash flows (Gabriel and Baker). 






Financial risk (FR) is given by the following expression (Gabriel and Baker): 
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where s1 and s2 are the standard deviations of net cash flows without and with (prior to 
debt servicing) debt financing, respectively;  x c  is expected net cash flows or net 
operating income without debt financing; and I is fixed debt servicing payments.
3  
Gabriel and Baker simplify their model by assuming the absence of a scale effect 
due to leverage.  This assumption simplifies (2) into the following form since leverage-
induced changes in the variability of net cash flows have been ruled out (hence s1 = s2): 










The above expression suggests that FR is actually dependent on the level of BR, 
which shows up in (3) as a partial determinant of the level of FR.  These two types of risk 
form an additive relationship to determine total risk (TR) as shown in the following 
derivation (Gabriel and Baker): 
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The risk-balancing hypothesis is best understood when the above expression for 
TR is analyzed in terms of a bound b for maximum total risk that a firm can tolerate 
(Gabriel and Baker): 
  .          
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Any exogenous shock affecting the level of BR would disrupt the total risk 
constraint and thus requires some strategy for restoring conditions that satisfy the above 
inequality.  A slack in the risk constraint results when some exogenous force brings down 
the BR level.  The FR component is also partly reduced (due to its own BR component) 
and the firm may choose to undertake riskier and more profitable production, investment 
or financing (or a combination of these) activities to take advantage of the slack in the 
constraint.  These strategies could ultimately raise the levels of BR and FR until the 
above constraint is satisfied once again. 
Conversely, adjustments in the firm’s financial structure could also be used (as a 
stand-alone strategy or in combination with risk reducing production and/or investment 
strategies) to counter the effect of exogenous shocks that raise the firm’s BR level. 
 
The Multiplicative Relationship 
This approach utilizes concepts of portfolio theory that form the basis of 
constructing a capital market line (CML).  Combinations of a risk-free asset and a 
dominant portfolio of risky assets define a set of possible risk-efficient portfolios from 
which an optimal capital structure can be determined.  Holdings of the risk-free asset 
indicate the firm’s financial leverage profile where positive holdings correspond to 
lending activities and negative holdings indicate borrowing from external sources.     6
In a borrowing scenario, the expected return to an investor’s wealth is given by 
the weighted returns on the risk-free asset and the portfolio of risky assets (Barry, Barry 
and Robison): 
                            . ) 6 ( i a a e iP P r r - =  
Translated into balance sheet terms, the subscript “a” corresponds to risky assets 
which is equivalent to a firm’s total assets (A), “i” stands for the risk-free asset 
represented by total debt (D) and “e” is the investor’s equity capital.  The weights on the 
returns Pa and Pi are the ratios A/E and D/E which are consistent with the balance sheet 
identity, A-D=E. 
Since asset i is risk-free with zero variance, the variance of the rate of return on 
equity is given by (Barry, Barry and Robison): 
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Using this framework, an expression for the total risk (TR) of an investor’s 
portfolio can be formulated through a measure of the coefficient of variation of the rate of 
return on the investor’s wealth or equity capital (Barry, Barry and Robison): 













TR can be easily decomposed into its components by considering that (similar to 
Gabriel and Baker) business risk (BR) can be measured as the coefficient of variation of 
the rate of return on risky assets: 
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Dividing TR by BR will yield an expression for financial risk (FR):   7








which can be interpreted as the rate of return on risky assets relative to the rate of return 
on equity capital – a flow measure of leverage. 
The multiplicative relationship between BR and FR in determining TR can be 
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which is equivalent to the expression in (8). 
The risk-balancing hypothesis can be illustrated graphically using the CML in 
Figure 1 (Barry and Robison).  Point C is the initial (equilibrium) optimal portfolio of 
risky and risk-free assets given the investor’s risk preference.  Whenever a parameter 
value changes, this portfolio becomes non-optimal, thus, requiring adjustments to restore 
optimal conditions.  An adjustment may take the form of a tradeoff between BR and FR.  
For example, an increase in sa rotates the CML downward around the risk-free rate i in 
the vertical axis and introduces a riskier market portfolio M” (Barry and Robison).  This 
causes an aggregate increase in TR.  Given the investor’s risk preference restricting the 
maximum allowable total risk at its original level (in the same notion that a maximum 
tolerable risk level b was specified in the additive approach), the possible strategies for 
attaining this goal include any or a combination of the following: reductions in financial 
leverage (risk balancing), borrowing cost and business risk. 
 
 
   8
Econometric Design 
A longitudinal farm-level data set is compiled to test the risk-balancing 
hypothesis using farms that are enrolled in the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management 
(FBFM) system.  This sampling of farms is limited to grain farms only.
4 The grain farms 
are further downsized to a subset of 80 farms that consistently maintained certified usable 
income statements over a seventeen-year period, from 1982 to 1998.
5 
This study will employ two econometric approaches to test the risk-balancing 
hypothesis.  The first phase of the analysis involves a cross-sectional regression utilizing 
80 farm observations (one mean value for each variable for each farm).  This procedure, 
however, could open up the same aggregation issue that was raised relative to the results 
obtained by Gabriel and Baker.  Although the extent of aggregation here is arguably 
lesser, this approach disregards effects of inter-year variations in the values of the 
variables that could influence risk-balancing decisions. Nonetheless, this approach is 
retained in this study since it could give an indication of the overall incidence of the 
farmers’ risk-balancing practices over a longer portion of the entire sample period.  
The second phase, a time series-cross sectional analysis, will utilize moving five-
year average measures for all the variables.  This approach increases the number of 
observations, solves the aggregation issue, and considers systematic relationships 
between variables based on intra- and inter-year variations in their values.  
This study adopts a straightforward measure of risk balancing as the dependent 
variable of the estimating equations. A correlation coefficient is calculated from a time 
series data on business risk and financial risk measures for each farm in the data set.   9
  The magnitude of a farm’s business risk is calculated as a moving three-year 
coefficient of variation of its net operating income (Gabriel and Baker).  Financial risk is 
represented by an estimate of the balancing component of its equation, the second 
component of (1.2), i.e. 
I
cx I -
 (Gabriel and Baker). 
  Considering that the previous, and not the current, period’s business risk 
condition, may influence a farm’s financial structure decision, the correlation coefficient 
measure is calculated based on pairings between a one-year lagged measure of business 
risk and the current period’s financial risk level.  
  The derivation of the risk balancing measures under the two econometric 
approaches is illustrated using the time-series data in Table 1 corresponding to a sample 
farm.  Under the cross-sectional approach, the correlation coefficient measure is based on 
fourteen (14) pairs of the risk measures starting from the first pair in 1985.  This pair 
includes a financial risk measure (FR) that corresponds to the interest to asset returns 
ratio (INTRAT) of the farm in 1985 and a business risk measure (BR) that corresponds to 
the CV of net operating farm income (NOBIT) calculated as of 1984.  This CV of 
NOBIT is derived from its mean and standard deviation based on the observations from 
the immediate past three years, from 1982 to 1984.   A correlation coefficient is 
calculated on all chronological pairs of these risk measures that sum up to fourteen (14) 
until the end of the time series in 1998.  The fourteen-year correlation measure for this 
farm is –0.2845 implying that increases in business risk on average were followed by 
decreases in financial risk, and vice versa. 
  On the other hand, the time series-cross sectional approach adopts a moving five- 
year correlation coefficient measure of risk balancing.  Hence, there are ten (10) risk   10
balancing measures for this farm starting from the first correlation coefficient of -0.0246 
calculated in 1989 based on the last five pairs of the risk measures.  (See column COR-5 
in Table 1) 
A negative correlation calculated from the pairings of risk measures will indicate 
that the farm has made offsetting adjustments in its leverage position in response to 
changes in its business risk condition.  This means that upward trends in the magnitude of 
business risk are associated with downward trends in the farm's financial risk position, 
thus confirming the incidence of risk balancing.  On the other hand, a positive correlation 
indicates the absence of the risk-balancing strategy. 
The analysis also utilizes regression procedures to determine factors that may be 
significantly related to risk balancing.  The explanatory variables will include the 
following structural and financial characteristics of farms to explore their possible 
linkages with risk balancing. 
•  Farm size 
Measured in tillable acres, size is expected to be negatively related to the 
correlation coefficient measure of risk balancing, the model’s dependent variable.  
In order to sustain the benefits of economies of scale and improved production 
efficiencies, larger farms are expected to prudently utilize their credit reserves 
capacity in order to balance business and financial risk levels. Size is considered 
an important factor influencing a farm’s choice of strategies for coping with risk 
(Harwood, et al.).  Moreover, Purdy, Langemeier and Featherstone present 
evidence of a significant positive size effect on a farm’s mean financial 
performance, although their framework could not establish a significant effect on   11
the variability of farm income.  Barry, Escalante and Bard, however, find that a 
significant negative size effect on income variability exists when both intra- and 
inter-year variations are considered in the estimating procedure. 
•  Management Expertise (AGE) 
The farmer's age shall be used as proxy for management expertise that is 
expected to vary negatively with the dependent variable.  Older, more 
experienced farm managers/operators are expected to be more adept at devising 
strategies that balance risks confronting the farm enterprise.  
•  Financial efficiency 
The farm's operating expense ratio (OPRAT), calculated by dividing the 
farm’s total operating expense (excluding interest and depreciation) by gross 
revenues, will be used as a measure of financial efficiency.  The logical 
expectation is for this variable to vary positively with the dependent variable.  
Lower values of this ratio, indicating higher levels of financial efficiency, are 
expected to be associated with higher incidence of the risk-balancing behavior.  A 
highly efficient farm that is able to keep operating expenses at low levels 
develops a cushion against high financing costs that may protect its realized net 
farm income levels from plunging below satisfactory levels.  Increased business 
risk exerts more pressure on operating expenses to rise. A highly efficient farm, in 
order to protect its bottom-line figure, would most likely reduce financing costs to 
stabilize its net income position.   
It can also be argued, however, that a negative financial efficiency effect is 
plausible under more positive behavioral expectations on farmers that are   12
relatively more financially distressed.  Less efficient farms plagued by dominant 
production costs relative to farm revenues are more vulnerable to further increases 
in business risk and thus, might be more inclined to adjust their financial risk 
positions. 
•  Tenure 
The farm’s tenure ratio, calculated as the ratio of owned acres to total farm 
acres, is expected to vary positively with the risk balancing measure.  This means 
that farms that own a greater percentage of the total farmland area will be less 
inclined to resort to risk balancing.  This argument is based on the low debt 
carrying capacity of farmland.  Scott provides evidence suggesting that leasing of 
farmland actually improves a farmer’s access to credit.  Results from another 
study (Ellinger and Barry) indicate that higher leasing ratios are associated with 
higher accounting rates of return and debt-to-asset ratios. 
Proxy measures of certain risk management strategies will also be included as 
additional regressors. Results of a survey conducted by the USDA (Harwood, et al.) 
indicate that farmers in general combine strategies in countering increasing income risk.  
Hence, most of the strategies included in this analysis are expected to be compatible with 
risk balancing  
•  Marketing Price Index 
A proxy measure to represent the aggregate, collective effect of a farm’s 
marketing practices is the ratio of average annual crop prices received by the 
farmer to the average annual crop prices received by all farms participating under   13
the FBFM system.  This measure is based on price data on the three major crops 
produced by Illinois grain farms: corn, soybeans and wheat.   
Barry and Baker justify that certain marketing strategies provide the firm with 
greater liquidity and thus, greater certainty of loan repayment that coincide with 
lenders’ preferences.  The results of another study conducted by Turvey and 
Baker indicate that hedging practices of farmers actually encourage higher debt 
levels because the former reduces overall business risk after offsetting some of the 
increased financial risk created by the latter. 
•  Insurance 
This strategy will be represented by the amount of insurance premium, 
inclusive of crop, liability and other types of insurance, spent on every acre tilled 
by the farm operator.  As the risk-balancing strategy discourages higher levels of 
debt in highly risky conditions, this strategy provides farmers with an additional 
source of liquidity in times of adversities.  The expected coefficient sign for this 
variable is positive, as higher insurance premium per acre could be associated 
with larger values of the risk balancing measure.  Payoffs from insurance 
programs usually serve as buffer against fluctuating incomes due to adverse 
conditions, thus has a stabilizing effect on farm revenues.  This effect therefore 
reduces the need for the farm to regulate the level of financial risk. 
•  Diversification Strategies 
  Measures of the farm’s diversification strategies are developed based on 








i share H  14
Under this approach, a fully specialized farm takes on an index value of 1 while 
smaller index values indicate more diversified business portfolios.  In this 
analysis, two measures of diversification are considered.  One is a measure of 
crop diversification that considers the revenue contributions of each of the three 
crops produced: corn, soybeans and wheat.  A second measure is added to capture 
the farm’s enterprise diversification strategy.  This measure considers the revenue 
shares of the crop enterprises as a whole and the farm’s livestock operations. 
Since lower H values are associated with diversification, a positive 
relationship between these variables and the risk balancing measure would 
indicate the latter strategy’s compatibility with enterprise or crop specialization.  
Negative relationships suggest a good combination of diversification and risk 
balancing strategies. 
Regional differentiation of production and marketing profiles can play an 
important factor in determining the compatibility between these diversification 
strategies and risk balancing.  For instance, a study on a sampling of Kansas farms 
(Purdy, Langemeier and Featherstone) relates a farm’s financial performance to 
the specialization of production activities.  The results indicate increased mean 
financial performance for farms that specialize in swine, dairy or crop production 
and decreased variability in financial performance among crop farms that 
diversify into livestock production (beef, swine, or dairy).   
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Farm-Level Evidence 
A descriptive summary of the fourteen-year mean values of the variables is 
presented in Table 2.  The 80 farms have been classified into four (4) classes based on 
their fourteen-year risk balancing (correlation coefficient) measures.  Farms whose 
historical business and financial risk levels produce negative correlation coefficients are 
classified under one of the two upper classes while the lower two classes consist of farms 
with positive risk balancing measures.  Based on the summary, a total of 47 farms belong 
to the upper two classes of risk balancing farms while the rest (33 farms) did not balance 
risks on the average over the entire sample period.  This means that close to 60% of the 
farmers in the sample balanced risks on the average over the seventeen-year period. 
There are no clear trends in the mean values of most of the explanatory variables 
reported in Table 2 across all four classes of the risk balancing measure.  Only the mean 
values for insurance expense, age and enterprise diversification index display consistent 
trends in values as the risk balancing class increases. 
Additional evidence is provided by a panel data set compiled from the same set of 
farms using the moving five-year average approach. Table 3 presents the annual 
distribution of farms across the four classes of risk balancing measures during the period 
1989 to 1998.  The farms were categorized this time according to their moving five-year 
correlation coefficient measures.  As can be gleaned from that summary, in nine (9) out 
of ten (10) years, the proportion of risk balancers has been above 50%.  The proportions 
were especially high in 1992 and 1998 at 69% and 76%, respectively. These results 
provide more solid empirical evidence to the hypothesis by confirming earlier findings in 
the cross-sectional analysis with much more disaggregated farm-level data.   16
 
Time Series-Cross Sectional (TSCS) Analysis
6 
This analysis is based on the moving five-year correlation coefficients for the 
dependent variable (risk-balancing measure) and moving five-year mean values for the 
explanatory variables. The moving average concept is essential to the development of a 
measure for the dependent variable, which involves the concept of business risk that can 
be captured by a measure of the coefficient of variation of net operating farm income.  In 
this analysis, the  “moving-average” concept is applied to all variables in both the right-
hand and the left-hand sides of the estimating equation. 
Diagnostic tests conducted on the panel data detect the presence of autocorrelated 
disturbances, although heteroscedasticity is not a problem.  Thus, the Parks method of 
TSCS regression is used for this analysis.  This method is ideal for data sets with such 
abnormalities since it performs a corrective procedure by initially assuming a first-order 
autoregressive error structure with contemporaneous correlation between cross-sections.  
Then, it estimates a covariance matrix by a two-stage procedure leading to the estimation 
of the regression parameters using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method (SAS 
Manual). 
Table 4 presents a summary of the regression coefficient estimates and their 
corresponding p values obtained under the Parks-TSCS method.  The model’s F statistic 
indicates that the model’s explanatory power is highly significant.  Its R
2 is relatively 
high at 90.99%.  Except for size and insurance, all variables are highly significant 
regressors.   17
The signs of the significant coefficient estimates for the structural variables 
coincide with their expected relationships to the risk balancing measure.  This means that 
in general risk-balancing grain farms tend to be managed by older farmers that own 
relatively less land.  Also, farms that experience greater financial distress as reflected by 
low levels of financial efficiency tend to be more vulnerable to increases in business risk 
and thus are more inclined to balance risks. 
Three of the four risk management strategies considered in this analysis are 
significantly related to the risk-balancing strategy.  The enterprise diversification variable 
is positively signed, thus suggesting that farms that balance risks usually diversify into 
crop and livestock production.  In contrast, the negative coefficient of the crop 
diversification variable indicates compatibility between risk balancing and crop 
specialization. 
These results reflect the actual farming practices of Illinois grain farms especially 
those located in the North Central region that highly specialize in corn and soybean 
production.  Barry, Escalante and Bard provide similar results in their study that 
identifies linkages between crop diversification, among other variables, and economic 
risk in detailed regional models that include a subset of North Central Illinois farms.  In 
their models, enterprise diversification becomes a significant regressor when included in 
a general model that considers all farms in the Illinois FBFM data set, regardless of the 
farms’ geographical location.  The variable, however, loses its significance in two 
disaggregated regional models, including the North Central Illinois regional model. It 
therefore seems that for grain farms, especially in the North Central Illinois region, the   18
benefits of risk reduction under an enterprise diversification scheme are outweighed by 
gains of comparative advantage enjoyed by these highly specialized grain farms.   
Finally, the marketing price index variable that captures the effects of the farm’s 
marketing strategy is also significant and positively signed.  The coefficient sign suggests 
that the incidence of risk balancing coincides with cases of low price indexes (i.e. the 
average annual crop price received by the farm is less than the average annual crop price 
received by all farms in the FBFM system).  Although observers (such as the majority of 
extension economists surveyed by Brorsen and Anderson in 1997) may argue that 
forward contracting, as a marketing strategy, results in relatively higher average farm 
prices, there is empirical evidence that suggests otherwise.  Townsend and Brorsen argue 
that the cost of forward contracting is actually not zero, thus reducing the level of the 
average farm price.
7 The result obtained in this analysis, therefore, suggests that risk 
balancing and forward contracting may be compatible strategies. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
The risk-balancing hypothesis, which involves the prudent and regulated use of a 
farm’s borrowing capacity in the face of increasing business risk conditions, has been 
firmly established as a normative concept in agricultural finance literature. Its intuitive 
appeal has motivated theoretical extensions in policy and other disciplines.  However, its 
strong analytic appeal is eroded by its lack of solid empirical support that must come 
from farm-level, instead of aggregated, data. 
This study has provided the necessary evidence to fill in this deficiency.  
Verification of the validity of the risk-balancing hypothesis has been established using   19
econometric procedures.  The econometric approach looked into trends in historical farm 
data to identify the frequency of risk balancing among farmers, determine the attributes 
of farmers that subscribe to the strategy and explore its compatibility with other risk 
management strategies.  The results confirm that more than half of the farmers in the 
sample indeed balanced business and financial risks over a seventeen-year period.  The 
dominance of risk-balancing farmers is maintained even when the farm samples were 
further disaggregated into ten five-year groups under the moving five-year average 
approach.  The non-risk balancers may have lower degrees of risk aversion or they may 
have employed other risk management methods not evident in these data. 
This class of risk-balancing farmers has also been identified as relatively older 
operators of farms with lower levels of financial efficiency and relatively higher 
proportions of leased to owned farmland.  Moreover, risk balancing was found to be 
compatible with crop specialization, enterprise diversification and marketing (such as 
forward contracting) strategies. 
  These results provide significant implications on the viability of risk balancing as 
a tool for risk management.  As the agricultural sector continues to confront nagging risks 
caused by market, production and even institutional uncertainties, the need for more 
effective strategic plans at the farm level becomes greater.   This study provides 
motivation for examining the extent of risk reduction realized under a more integrated 
risk management approach.  Given the compatibility between risk balancing and certain 
alternative strategies demonstrated in this study, risk balancing is expected to become an 
integral component in a menu of strategic plans designed to counter increasing income 
risk.   20
Footnotes 
1.  For simplicity, financial leverage shall be used in this study to pertain only to debt 
financing.  The farm’s leasing contracts, though legitimately considered as another 
form of leveraging, shall be treated separately. 
2.  The hypothesis can also be derived using a different approach, the expected utility-
mean-variance approach in deriving the hypothesis (Barry, Baker and Sanint; 
Collins).   
3.  The parameter “I” would include interest and principal payments only if  x c is defined 
in terms of net cash flows or interest expenses only if the net operating income 
method is used. 
4.  The Illinois FBFM defines grain farms as those whose value of feed fed to all 
livestock enterprises is less than 40% of crop returns. 
5.  Actually, there are 111 farms that passed the criterion of continuous certification over 
the seventeen-year period.  However, farms that had incomplete observations for any 
of the variables used in the analysis for the entire period were excluded from the data 
set.  
6.  An estimation procedure involving ordinary least squares regression is also applied to 
the cross-sectional data. The results are less insightful.  The entire model’s 
explanatory power is very low (R
2 of 10.76%) and insignificant (p value of 0.3342).  
Only one of eight regressors, the insurance variable, is significant at the 5% 
confidence level. 
7.  The major effect of forward contracting is on óp, the variability of commodity prices 
(Barry and Willman; Escalante).  If óp declines more than the average farm price (ìP)   21
declines, then the coefficient of variation of farm prices (óp/ìP) experiences an overall 
decline.  This could allow the farm’s level of financial risk to increase.  In this sense, 
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              Figure 1: Shift in Risk Efficient Set for a Change in Variance of Risky 
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1982  0.1566  38,691             
1983  0.0655  70,482             
1984  0.1687  38,045  49,073  18,544         
1985  0.0871  64,451  57,659  17,252  0.3779  0.0871     
1986  0.1679  42,172  48,223  14,205  0.2992  0.1679     
1987  0.0643  99,716  68,780  29,015  0.2946  0.0643     
1988  0.1575  39,360  60,416  34,064  0.4219  0.1575     
1989  0.1023  72,346  70,474  30,221  0.5638  0.1023  -0.0246   
1990  0.1039  79,433  63,713  21,386  0.4288  0.1039  -0.0784   
1991  0.3070  30,983  60,921  26,168  0.3357  0.3070  -0.2506   
1992  0.1086  86,734  65,717  30,301  0.4295  0.1086  -0.7466   
1993  0.1103  73,212  63,643  29,081  0.4611  0.1103  -0.7514   
1994  0.2027  44,863  68,270  21,369  0.4569  0.2027  -0.7731   
1995  0.1629  40,117  52,731  17,895  0.3130  0.1629  -0.5132   
1996  0.2256  33,678  39,553  5,614  0.3394  0.2256  -0.4339   
1997  0.1542  50,943  41,579  8,725  0.1419  0.1542  -0.0054   












Table 2:  Fourteen-Year Cross Sectional Mean Values of Explanatory Variables 
According to Risk Balancing Class 
Risk Balancing Classes   
Variables  -0.80 to 0.40  -0.39 to 0.00  0.01 to 0.40  0.41 to 1.00 
No. of farms  10  37  28  5 
Size (Acres)  624  848  828  886 
OPRAT (Ratio)  0.5777  0.5525  0.5692  0.5854 
Tenure Ratio  0.2182  0.2235  0.2582  0.1767 
Age (Years)  56  51  50  46 
Insur Exp/Acre ($)  9.07  7.18  6.50  5.55 
Crop Diver Index  0.5104  0.5118  0.4959  0.5112 
Enterp Diver Index  0.8815  0.9373  0.9418  0.9669 




















Table 3:  Number of Grain Farms According to Risk Balancing Classes 











% of Risk 
Balancers 
1989  30  19  16  15  61.25 
1990  31  17  12  20  60.00 
1991  30  20  15  15  62.50 
1992  31  24  13  12  68.75 
1993  24  20  9  27  55.00 
1994  18  26  15  21  55.00 
1995  18  21  17  24  48.75 
1996  23  20  18  19  53.75 
1997  24  22  23  11  57.50 
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Table 4:  Regression Coefficient Estimates and Significance 
Time Series Cross Sectional (Parks) Model 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient Estimate  Prob > /T/ 
Intercept  -0.16267  0.0211 
Size  -0.0006  0.1103 
OPRAT  -0.06213  0.0006 
Tenure  0.134645  0.0079 
Age  -0.00154  0.0573 
Insurance Exp./Acre  0.000057  0.9185 
H Index – Crops  -0.21674  0.0001 
H Index – Enterprises  0.225873  0.0001 
Mktg Price Index  0.114103  0.0001 
R Square/Prob>F  0.9099  0.0001 
 